


~~SENSITIVE~~

CIA/SAVA /WVIND 740613



WEEKLY VIETNAM INDICATORS

Week Ending 13 June 1970

NSA Declassification/Release Instructions on File.


For the President Only

~~Top Secret~~

SOUTH VIETNAM WEEKLY INDICATORS


1968-1970

Weekly average for each month




FEBRUARY - MAY 1970

Weekly data as reported




US BATTLE DEATHS


increased to 135 from last week's 119.




SOUTH VIETNAMESE BATTLE DEATHS




dropped sharply to 298 from last week's 418. The official total will change as late reports are received and will be lower than figures released to the press by the GVN.




INFILTRATORS DETECTED IN PIPELINE




stand at one battalion-size group and one small group, with a total strength of 646. Since 23 October 1969, an estimated 60,000-61,500 infiltrators have entered the pipeline.




ENEMY-INITIATED INCIDENTS




remained at nearly the same level with 978 reported vice 973 last week.




ENEMY KILLED IN ACTION



rose to 2,051 as opposed to 1,869 last week.



SOUTH VIETNAMESE EFFECTIVENESS



as measured by the percentages of enemy killed by RVN forces was 65% compared to last week's 66%.

Statistics for the latest week shown are preliminary

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

Enemy Activity

Enemy-initiated activity in South Vietnam was again at a relatively high level during the past week as the Communist spring offensive entered its final phase. At least one attack, which caused serious civilian casualties and the destruction of the hamlet of Thanh My in Quang Nam Province, appeared to be a calculated effort to terrorize the population and disrupt the pacification program rather than to achieve any military advantage. Other incidents of this nature will probably occur as the Communists increase their use of terrorism for political purposes.

In Cambodia, Communist forces continue to deploy westward, while continuing to maintain pressure on population centers in the north. At Siem Reap, fighting has subsided and while Siem Reap and its air-fields remain under government control, portions of the Angkor Wat temple complex appear to be occupied by the Communists who reportedly are establishing strong defensive positions there. FANK will not attack them for fear of damaging the ruins. Kompong Thom, Tonle Bet and, for the first time, Kompong Speu received Communist attacks during the week. The Communists seized Kompong Speu, thus cutting Route 4, the road link between Phnom Penh and Kompong Som (Sihanoukville). An operation to regain the town is underway, but the issue is still in doubt. On 10 June, the government forces opened a sweep operation south of the Tonle Sap lake. A potential threat to Phnom Penh has developed in an area some 20 miles east of the city, while an enemy regimental size unit is reported to be located only 12 miles to the south.

The southwest monsoonal rains have dampened down military operations in northern Laos. Government forces attempting to recapture Ban Na north of Long Tieng, have been bogged down by a combination of weather and stiffened Communist resistance. Meanwhile, the enemy continues to engage in resupply activity in the Plain of Jars area. In the northwest, the Chinese Communist construction, security, and air defense forces apparently intend to remain in Laos through the rainy season. In the south, government forces are trying to recapture Saravane, while a new threat is developing farther south near the key town of Pakse.

Enemy Infiltration

One battalion-size group and one small group were detected entering the pipeline during the week as infiltration into Vietnam remained light. This brings to six the number of normal size, four-digit infiltration groups believed to have begun infiltrating southward in the past two months, a level consistent with last year. There has, however, apparently been an increase in infiltration into southern Laos in recent weeks. Since early May, at least seven Laos-destined groups have been detected, including two of battalion size, the first such large, Laos-bound groups ever noted. It is also possible that these troops may be destined for Cambodia rather than Laos.

The total number of infiltrators entering the pipeline since 23 October 1969 stands at some 60,000-61,500.

South Vietnam Developments

The South Vietnamese security agencies have a currency smuggling case under investigation which has the potential of further exacerbating relations between President Thieu and Vice President Ky. The leader of the ring, a wealthy Chinese named De, has been long associated with Ky as a financial supporter; and although a wide range of prominent politicians and military men have accepted monetary favors from De, the Ky camp is making special efforts to quash the case. Despite the fact that Thieu's wife has reportedly accepted foreign exchange from De while abroad, Thieu seems willing to provoke a public scandal in order to undercut this potential source of financial support for Ky's campaign should the latter decide to run in next year's Presidential elections. Security officials believe that Thieu is determined to prosecute the culprits even if cabinet members are involved, but he may have second thoughts when the full scope of the investigation is revealed.

Communist Developments

A recent session of North Vietnam's National Assembly may have been called for the purpose of ratifying the regime's decision to expand the scope of its involvement in Indochina. The assembly meets only rarely, and then usually for the purpose of providing a legislative rubber-stamp for new policy decisions. While most of the public pronouncements on the meeting were routine, the speeches of National Assembly Chairman Truong Chinh and Premier Pham Van Dong seem to be warning the people that they must make heavy sacrifices in support of an even larger effort in the south. The depth of this commitment to a more militant line is not yet clear, but the capture of Attapeu and Saravane in Laos, widespread military pressure in Cambodia, continuing infiltration, the continuation of Laotian supply activities in the rainy season, and plans for a "summer offensive" in South Vietnam, appear to be elements of this militant posture.

Other Developments

Souvanna Phouma has reiterated his intention to keep Laos neutral, as defined by the Geneva Accords, in the face of southern rightist and South Vietnamese pressure to enter an anti-Communist military alliance with Thailand, Cambodia, and South Vietnam. Souvanna has been under increasing criticism from the right for his continued neutralist stance since the fall of the southern province capital of Attapeu in late April, but so far has resisted rightist pressure to fill the vacant Communist positions in the Provisional National Union Government of Laos. The pressure to join in an anti-Communist military alliance comes from some conservative politicians who appear to be abetted by the South Vietnamese ambassador. Souvanna's real strength continues to lie in U.S. support and the inability of his opponents to agree on a replacement. Realizing that he is in political trouble, Souvanna has been unusually active in military and political circles lately and has privately acknowledged the need for some cabinet changes.

~~Top Secret~~